No. 2015-CA-001959-ME.

 SHAWN HUFFMAN, Appellant, v. ANGELA HUFFMAN, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Rendered: December 22, 2016.

Attorney(s) appearing for the Case

Jason A. Bowman, Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellant.

Lauren Adams Ogden, Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellee.




DIXON, Judge.

Shawn Huffman appeals an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion to restore his parenting time with his children. We affirm.

Shawn and his former wife, Angela Huffman, share joint custody of their three children, who are triplets. Pursuant to an agreed order entered in 2010, the parties worked with a parenting coordinator to resolve conflicts regarding the time-sharing schedule. In 2014, the parenting coordinator restricted Shawn’s parenting time due to Shawn’s use of alcohol around the children. Thereafter, the court rendered an order reflecting the parties’ agreement that Shawn would not consume alcohol around the children, he would have supervised weekend parenting time, and the parenting coordinator had discretion to limit Shawn’s parenting time based on his compliance with court orders. Nearly a year later, Shawn filed a motion to restore his parenting time, alleging it had again been restricted by the parenting coordinator. The parenting coordinator submitted a letter to the court withdrawing from the case and recommending the court consider the wishes of the children, who were nearly seventeen years’ old at that time. At the hearing on Shawn’s motion, the court determined that it would pass the motion one week and directed Angela to file a response to the motion as to her position on the modification of Shawn’s parenting time. At a hearing the following week, the court interviewed the children to ascertain their wishes regarding their time with Shawn. The court offered the parties an opportunity to submit written questions for the court to ask the children; however, both parties declined. In an order rendered November 19, 2015, the court denied Shawn’s motion to restore his parenting time. The court addressed each child’s individual concerns and concluded the children were mature enough to make independent decisions about spending time with Shawn. The court determined that it was in the children’s best interest for Shawn to have supervised parenting time every other weekend if the children so desired. This appeal followed.

Shawn contends he was denied procedural due process when the court failed to conduct a hearing where he could present testimony and evidence on the issue of parenting time. Shawn also asserts the court improperly delegated judicial authority to the parenting coordinator. After careful review of the record, we conclude these arguments were not preserved for appellate review and therefore we affirm.

First, Shawn failed to include a statement of preservation for his appellate arguments. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(v) requires “. . . at the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.” In his brief, Shawn asserts two distinct arguments without any reference to how those arguments were preserved; furthermore, our review of the record indicates Shawn did not raise these issues in the trial court. Although Shawn contends he was denied due process, the record shows he did not object to the manner in which the court addressed his motion, and he acquiesced in the court’s decision to only hear testimony from the children. Further, regarding the court’s alleged delegation of judicial authority, the record reflects that Shawn did not specifically present this argument to the trial court. “The function of the Court of Appeals is to review possible errors made by the trial court, but if the trial court had no opportunity to rule on the question, there is no alleged error for this court to review.” Kaplon v. Chase, 690 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Ky. App. 1985). Thus, we need not reach the merits of Shawn’s arguments because he failed to preserve them for appellate review.

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.